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 As a prelude to articles published in this special issue, I briefly sketch changing 
historiographical conventions regarding the ‘occult’ in recent history of science and medicine 
scholarship. Next, a review of standard claims regarding psychical research and parapsychology in 
philosophical discussions of the demarcation problem reveals that these have tended to disregard 
basic primary sources and instead rely heavily on problematic popular accounts, simplistic notions 
of scientific practice, and outdated teleological historiographies of progress. I conclude by 
suggesting that rigorous and sensitively contextualized case studies of past elite heterodox scientists 
may be potentially useful to enrich historical and philosophical scholarship by highlighting 
epistemologies that have fallen through the crude meshes of triumphalist and postmodernist 
historiographical generalizations alike. 
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 Historiographies of science and the ‘occult’ 
The past decades have seen an ongoing trend of historical interest in nineteenth-century 
mesmerism, spiritualism, psychical research and related areas western intellectuals are accustomed 
to view as inherently ‘irrational’ and ‘unscientific’. While the bulk of this literature has been 
produced by general and cultural historians and scholars in literary, religious and gender studies, 
until recently there has been a notable paucity of work in these fields by historians of late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century science and medicine. This was in striking contrast to the 
wealth of available historical scholarship exploring the intersections between science and early 
modern occult practices and beliefs, e.g. alchemy, astrology, Renaissance natural magic, biblical 
prophecy, eschatology, witchcraft and magical healing. Hence, when I sent out the call for papers 
for the international conference ‘Psychical Research and Parapsychology in the History of Science 
and Medicine’, held at the UCL Centre for the History of Psychological Disciplines in London on 
25-27 January 2013, the main stimulus to organise such a meeting was to fathom and consolidate 
historical work in these areas.
1
 This special issue with a selection of papers presented at the 
conference is therefore a first concerted attempt to close a gap that has existed in history of science 
and medicine scholarship on the ‘occult’, and to stimulate further work informed by fundamental 
historiographical revisions that have escaped authors still adhering to simplistic science-occultism 
dichotomies when writing about past actors and developments deviating from present-day western 
standard epistemologies. 
In fact, even the most conservative historian of science will now teach what previous 
generations ignored or denied: For instance, it is now commonly acknowledged that the 
revolutionary scientific works of Brahe, Kepler, Newton and other early moderns were inextricably 
linked to their committed beliefs in biblical prophecy, astrology and other now unorthodox ideas 
and practices, and are difficult to appreciate when taken out of their original context. Other ‘fathers 
of modern science’ like Francis Bacon and Robert Boyle observed preternatural goings-on and 
insisted that ghosts and certain instances of distant mental influence constituted facts of nature.
2
 
During the Enlightenment it was not so much natural philosophy or medicine but the anti-
Catholicism of rationalistic Christianity that condemned natural magic and empirical approaches to 
‘things that go bump in the night’ as intrinsically vulgar and laughable. While Protestant as well as 
irreligious Enlightenment writers ridiculed reports of apparitions and witchcraft out of intellectual 
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 A smaller symposium specifically addressing the links between modern psychology and psychical research was held in 
August 2010 at the 29
th
 Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences, University 
of Utrecht, and resulted in a special issue of History of the Human Sciences, published in 2012. 
2
 Seminal studies of early modern science and magic are, e.g., Webster (1982) and Clark (1999). On Bacon and Boyle 
see, fore example, Henry (2002) and Hunter (2001). 
 discourse (thereby laying the foundations of modern anthropological theories of magic and 
shamanism), empirical interest in reported occult phenomena persisted as evidenced by medically 
and scientifically eminent proponents of Swedenborgianism, animal magnetism, romantic 
Naturphilosophie and related traditions.
3
  
After modern spiritualism began to spread as a global movement in the mid-nineteenth 
century, the modern standard historiography of the opposition of science to magic began assuming 
shape steadier still when spokesmen of Christianity, agnosticism, secular humanism and 
philosophical materialism found themselves in rare unison by declaring proponents of spiritualism 
and other heterodox movements as mutual enemies. Usually from a safe distance, popularizers of 
fledgling scientific professions decried animal magnetism, spiritualism and related areas as 
‘enthusiasm’, ‘superstition’, ‘pseudo-science’ and related shibboleths employed to repudiate 
traditions deviating from enlightened norms of belief. But not everybody was content to deride or 
pathologize reports of ‘marvellous’ events. When the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) was 
founded in England in 1882 to investigate certain alleged anomalous phenomena “without prejudice 
or prepossession of any kind, and in the same spirit of exact and unimpassioned inquiry which has 
enabled Science to solve so many problems, once not less obscure nor less hotly debated” (“Objects 
of the Society,” 1882, p. 4), enlightened standard notions of the incompatibility of progressiveness 
and scientific interest in ‘miraculous’ phenomena became challenged once more. After all, it has 
often been observed that the Society’s early list of members reads like the Who is Who of Victorian 
and Edwardian science, including iconic figures like Alfred Russel Wallace, William Crookes, J. J. 




Moreover, it was not just leading representatives of the physical sciences that made forays 
into some of the most hotly disputed areas of human experience. Just prior to the comparatively late 
emergence of professionalized psychology in Britain, leading figures within the SPR were partially 
successful in establishing an original English brand of psychological experimentation in the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century and represented British psychology at the first four International 
Congresses of Psychology (Le Maléfan & Sommer, forthcoming; Rosenzweig, Holtzman, Sabourin, 
& Bélanger, 2000; Sommer, 2013a, chapter 3). Merging psychological studies with 
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 Regarding the historicity of enlightened contempt for ‘miraculous’ phenomena, see Daston & Park (1998) and Porter 
(1999). For revisions of stereotypical images of Romantic sciences as intrinsically irrational see, e.g., Cunningham & 
Jardine (1990) and Knight (1998). For a more detailed account of fundamental historiographical repercussions of post-
Enlightenment wars on magical belief during the professionalization of modern psychology see Sommer (2013a). 
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 Important studies of the early SPR are Gauld (1968) and Williams (1984). Janet Oppenheim’s standard work The 
Other World (1985) is copiously researched but ultimately restricted in analysis by adherence to conservative standard 
historiographies of the ‘occult’ as the absolute antithesis of ‘science’. 
 methodologically sophisticated tests of telepathy and mediumship, in collaboration with foreign 
psychologists English psychical researchers such as Edmund Gurney and Frederic W. H. Myers 
made significant conceptual, empirical and methodological contributions to the psychology of 
hypnotism, eyewitness testimony and hallucinations (cf. Ellenberger, 1970; Gauld, 1992; Crabtree, 
1993; Alvarado, 2002; Sommer, 2013a, chapter 3). Often in collaboration with the English 
researchers, representatives of French psychology such as Charles Richet, Henri Beaunis and Pierre 
Janet conducted experiments in hypnotic telepathy (Dingwall, 1968; Plas, 2012); young 
psychologists formed societies and associations serving as conduits for unorthodox English and 
French strands of psychological experimentation in Germany (Kurzweg, 1976; Sommer, 2013b); 
and William James and Théodore Flournoy as the ‘fathers’ of professionalized psychology in the 
US and Switzerland adopted Frederic Myers’s radical integrative research programme and sought to 
expand the ‘new psychology’ by integrating psychical research (cf. Burkhardt & Bowers, 1986; 
Kelly et al., 2007; Shamdasani, 1994; Taylor, 1983, 1996; Sommer, 2013a, chapter 3). 
Other pioneering psychologists particularly in Germany and the US, however, were deeply 
worried about politically damaging associations of the nascent psychological profession they 
struggled to establish with ideas and questions despised by conservative religious and irreligious 
intellectuals alike. Going to war against the deviant researchers, leaders of modern professionalized 
psychology such as Wilhelm Wundt, Wilhelm Preyer, Hugo Münsterberg, G. Stanley Hall, Joseph 
Jastrow, James McKeen Cattell and Edward B. Titchener lumped together naïve spiritualism and the 
hard-nosed empiricism of William James and other elite psychical researchers, accusing them of 
impeding progress by promoting dangerous superstitions. Eschewing constructive dialogues with 
their targets, and publishing polemical critiques in popular magazines and pamphlets, they relied on 
often unspecified allegations of fraud, insinuations of methodological incompetence, claims of 
metaphysical bias and charges of mental illness, explaining scientific interest in ‘miraculous’ 
phenomena by recourse to enlightened anthropological-pathological theories of magical belief and 
generalized principles of the psychology of error (Coon, 1992; Sommer, 2012b, 2013a, chapter 4; 
Taylor, 1996; Wolffram, 2006).
5
 
These and related large-scale boundary disputes had a lasting impact on popular as well as 
scholarly historiographies of modern sciences and the ‘occult’, and an almost unchanged 
nineteenth-century Science versus superstition rhetoric still prominently figures in the public 
understanding and popularization of science literature in general, and the construction of the 
scientific image of modern psychology in particular. These historiographical artefacts continue to 
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 Early professional psychologists pathologizing ‘occult belief’ along with epistemically pluralistic elite psychical 
research were, e.g., Jastrow (1889, 1927), Wundt (1892, p. 110), and Hall (1910, 1918). 
 powerfully shape academic identities and standards of what it means to be ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’, 
while journalistically well-connected ‘Skeptic’ associations for the promotion of ‘Science’ and 
‘Reason’ continue to mushroom all over the world to ‘protect’ and ‘educate’ the public by 
aggressively debunking real and assumed charlatans and by promulgating hair-raisingly naïve 
teleologies of scientific progress and practice.
6
  
All the while, intellectuals and scientists have continued to be interested in a certain class of 
alleged anomalous phenomena forming the subject matter of psychical research and 
parapsychology,
7
 and chairs and research groups dedicated to parapsychological (or psi) research 
have come and gone at universities worldwide. To date, there have been hundreds of volumes of 
scholarly periodicals with original empirical and conceptual contributions. To name just some of the 
now more readily accessible nineteenth and early-twentieth century titles, the Proceedings of the 
SPR (since 1884) and the American SPR (since 1885) have set the highest standards of late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century scholarly discourse for psychical research. Less consistent in 
quality, the journals Psychische Studien, Sphinx and Zeitschrift für Parapsychologie are among the 
important historical titles in German language, while the Annales de sciences psychique and Revue 
métapsychique have been major sources of information regarding the early Francophone context.  
Since World War II there has been no want of parapsychological periodicals either. The SPR 
and ASPR have each continued to publish their Journal and Proceedings, and in 1957 scientists 
interested in psi phenomena began consolidating their work within the Parapsychological 
Association (an affiliate of the American Association for the Advancement of Science), which 
issues the Journal of Parapsychology (founded in 1937 by Rhine and co-edited until his death by 
Harvard psychologist William McDougall) as well as the likewise peer-reviewed Proceedings of 
annual meetings (previously published as Research in Parapsychology).
8
 In addition to journals and 
the edited book series Advances in Parapsychological Research (nine volumes to date), there has 
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 been a wealth of scholarly monographs, overviews, bibliographical reference works and textbooks 
of parapsychological research (see, for example, Driesch, 1933; Greenwood, Pratt, Rhine, Smith, & 
Stuart, 1940; White & Dale, 1973; White, 1976, 1990; Wolman, 1977; Edge, Morris, Palmer, & 
Rush, 1986; Irwin & Watt, 2007). 
Whereas the most sophisticated and therefore scientifically relevant part of this literature is 
typically excluded from popular and educational writings on science and the ‘paranormal’, 
historical accounts routinely exclude or belittle preoccupations of many well-known scientists with 
controversial questions. For instance, it is not widely known that psychologists like William 
McDougall, Gardner Murphy and Hans Eysenck openly advocated psychical research (e.g. 
Sommer, 2013a, Introduction); Hans Berger’s development of the electroencephalogram (EEG) was 
driven by what he believed was a dramatic ‘crisis telepathy’ experience involving his sister 
(Kramer, 2013; Millett, 2001); Kurt Gödel became convinced of the reality of telepathy after 
conducting experiments with his wife (Dawson, 1997, pp. 29-30); Wolfgang Pauli saw a link 
between quantum mechanics and ‘poltergeist’-style mind-matter interactions he was said to have 
experienced (Enz, 2002; Meier, 2001); Albert Einstein expressed his conviction that telepathy 
“deserves the most earnest consideration, not only of the laity, but also of the psychologists by 
profession” (Einstein, 1962, p. ix), and even two members of the Vienna Circle, Hans Hahn (a vice 
president of the Austrian SPR) and Rudolf Carnap, were keenly interested in psychical research 
(much to the chagrin of Wittgenstein – see Carnap, 1963, p. 26; Neurath & Cohen, 1973, p. 43). As 
contributions to this special issue confirm, these examples are no mere anachronisms or 
eccentricities, but demonstrate that serious interest in so-called psychic phenomena has endured in 
sometimes eminent members of scientific communities. 
 
Psychical research and the demarcation problem 
While late-nineteenth and twentieth century empirical interest in the ‘miraculous’, far from 
constituting a cultural anomaly in need of historical explanation, can be understood in terms of 
continuity, popular standard historiographies not only persist as the backbone for writings on the 
public understanding of science but have also informed professional discussions of the demarcation 
problem in philosophy. Though the following review is not intended as a prescriptive contribution 
to the philosophy of science, it will argue that here as elsewhere one can formulate a pessimistic 
induction: those expressing the strongest misgivings about unorthodox disciplines are typically 
those who made the least effort of familiarizing themselves with basic primary sources.  
Perhaps the most frequent standard claim regarding psychical research is an alleged renitent 
metaphysical bias that has been thought to be its organizing principle and caused the typical lack of 
 rigour that is supposed to have characterized this work. Mario Bunge, for example, began his 
analysis of parapsychology by stating that it was “the modern name for spiritualism, mediumnism, 
cartomancy, and other archaic beliefs and practices” (Bunge, 1967, p. 43).9 In a later article, Bunge 
further complained that parapsychological researchers were “more attracted to the supernatural than 
to the material, and to the arcane than to what can be explained. No wonder, for they are spiritualists 
not materialists” (Bunge, 1991, p. 135). Similarly, for Paul Churchland (1998) the history of 
parapsychology reduces to that of a collective attempt of finding “some unpatchable hole in 
materialism” (p. 319), and in his contribution to an Aristotelian Society symposium on psychical 
research, philosopher Robert Robinson maintained the discipline’s history “has told us nothing 
about man’s nature except that he likes mysteries and likes to believe in spirits and wants to go on 
living” (Robinson, 1950, p. 205). 
Historians (as well as many present-day scientists) will find Bunge’s insistence on a 
materialistic world-view as a necessary condition of scientificity odd not least since this criterion 
would remove large sectors of iconic figures ranging from Bacon to Planck from the scientific halls 
of fame. Moreover, relevant primary sources quickly reveal that elite psychical researchers were 
driven by a variety of concerns and held often conflicting epistemological presuppositions, ranging 
from desires to establish evidence-based foundations for undogmatic and humanistic forms of 
spirituality to positivist-inductivist approaches indifferent and even utterly unsympathetic to 
religious questions (Sommer, 2013a, chapter 2). Not only the Vienna Circle example enormously 
complicates assertions of metaphysical bias. The doyen of French psychical research, Nobel 
laureate Charles Richet, for instance, categorically rejected the ‘spirit hypothesis’ to account for 
mediumistic phenomena, and being a materialist perhaps as absolute as Bunge and Churchland, he 
was confident that sooner or later explanations compatible with his materialist convictions would 
come forth for telepathy, clairvoyance and other controversial phenomena of whose existence he 
became fully convinced (cf. Richet, 1923, 1924). Other ‘anomalistic inductivist’ psychical 
researchers like the Munich physician and sexologist Albert von Schrenck-Notzing, the 
philosopher-psychologist Julian Ochorowicz (a leader of Polish positivism and original instigator of 
the International Congress of Psychology) and the Italian psychologist Enrico Morselli (see Maria 
Teresa Brancaccio’s essay in this volume) had absolutely no interests in promoting religious tenets 
through their investigations of mediums either, and like Richet they were decidedly hostile to the 
‘spirit hypothesis’. There was never a time when the community of parapsychological researchers 
was dominated by spiritualist or metaphysical dogma, and some prominent parapsychologists 
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 Philosopher Nicholas Maxwell likewise thought that parapsychology belonged to the “the most bizarre and absurd of 
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 continue to hold squarely epiphenomalist and materialist positions today.
10
 
Moreover, the history of psychical research and its repudiation from the territories of 
mainstream science is not simply one of ‘science’ (let alone ‘scientific materialism’) versus 
‘superstition’ as popular standard claims would have it. In fact, whereas today political assaults on 
parapsychology are typically spearheaded by well-connected popularizers of secular humanism and 
militant atheism, among the most outspoken opponents of nineteenth-century psychical research 
were men of science and letters with strong religious convictions. Michael Faraday (who would 
nowadays qualify as a ‘creationist’ and who considered spiritualism a blasphemy), for example, 
accepted an invitation to investigate the medium D. D. Home, but only the condition that Home 
were to admit, should Faraday corroborate any anomalous effects, “the utterly contemptible 
character of them” (Tyndall, 1868, p. 6, cited in Lamont, 2005, p. 132). Hardly surprising, Home 
did not accept Faraday’s caveat, and yet enlightened journalists quickly began to spread the word 
that the medium had evaded investigation by the great scientist.
11
 Shannon Delorme’s contribution 
to this special issue on the Unitarian physiologist and vocal public opponent of Alfred R. Wallace, 
William Crookes and other scientists investigating spiritualism, William B. Carpenter, likewise 
shows that popular claims of the refutation of certain unorthodox traditions and beliefs having 
occurred through ‘science’ (i.e. by careful and dispassionate empirical testing) need to be soundly 
qualified. 
Another standard objection to psychical research is that its supposed effects are notoriously 
capricious and unreplicable. Mario Bunge, for whom the history of parapsychology merely boils 
down to a continued “conspiracy” of scientific dilettantes (Bunge, 1967, p. 45), observed that 
psychic phenomena “are not repeatable, at least in the presence of unbelievers” (p. 44). Similarly, 
Antony Flew agreed that “If scientific-minded people view the evidence of psychical research with 
suspicion because it is not repeatable, then they are quite right. The whole object of the scientific 
exercise is to discover true laws, and theories that explain the truth of these laws (Flew, 1978, p. 
268). As Richard Noakes’ contribution to this volume strikingly shows, however, it is not only since 
Michael Polanyi (1962) discussed essentially tacit factors in the measurement and replication of 
effects even in conventional science that simplistic concepts of experimental replicability have been 
                                                 
10
 For example, the current president of the SPR, psychologist Richard Broughton, and the lead investigator of the 
famous CIA ‘Stargate’ project, physicist Edwin May (a disciple of Daniel Dennett), are among those categorically 
rejecting any transcendental, religious or spiritual implications of parapsychology. For a survey of epistemological 
positions within the community of parapsychological researchers, see Blackmore (1989). On the question of epistemic 
pluralism in parapsychology see also Hövelmann (1987). 
11
 Some decades later, psychologists ruthlessly guarding the territories of their nascent profession routinely emphasised 
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 subjected to more subtle analysis.
12
  
Moreover, though a consultation of some of the primary literature cited above will quickly 
reveal a lack of consensus which if any of the psychic phenomena have been established beyond 
doubt within the parapsychological community,
13
 even unsympathetic external observers have 
occasionally expressed the opinion that the replication rate in parapsychology was remarkable and 
the evidence therefore conclusive. Alan Turing, for example, commented on the accumulated 
experimental data: “How we should like to discredit them! Unfortunately the statistical evidence, at 
least for telepathy, is overwhelming” (Turing, 1950, p. 453). Likewise, mathematician George 
Spencer-Brown admitted that he could not fault the typical methodological rigour and validity of 
parapsychological experimentation and – convinced psi phenomena were absolutely impossible – 
found the accumulating data so robust that instead of employing popular standard responses such as 
fraud or methodological incompetence concluded that Rhine and colleagues had provided “the most 
prominent empirical reason for beginning to doubt the universal applicability of classical frequency 
probability” (Spencer-Brown, 1957, p. 247). Among philosophers of science, Michael Scriven has 
expressed similarly reaffirming opinions regarding the robustness of parapsychological effects. 
Juxtaposing psychoanalysis and parapsychology, he believed that “psychoanalysis provides us with 
a great theory without a factual foundation; parapsychology, a factual basis on which there is yet to 
be built a great theory” (Scriven, 1964, p. 104).14 
When Francis Bacon proposed experiments to test fascinatio (an early modern equivalent of 
psi) he noted: “It is true, that that may hold in these things which is the general Root of 
Superstition; namely, that men observe when things hit, and not when they miss, and commit to 
Memory the one, and forget and pass over the other” (Bacon, 1670, p. 212). But he also cautioned 
that “Men are to admonished, that they do not withdraw credit from the Operations by Transmission 
of Spirits and Force of Imagination, because the effects fail sometimes” (ibid., p. 198). Long before 
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 psychologists began studying the role of experimenter effects as a methodological problem in 
conventional as well as unorthodox science, psychical researchers like Edmund Gurney argued:  
The man who first hears of thought-transference very naturally imagines that, if it is 
a reality, it ought to be demonstrated to him at a moment’s notice. He forgets that the 
experiment being essentially a mental one, his own presence [...] may be a factor in 
it; that he is demanding that a delicate weighing operation shall be carried out, while 
he himself, a person of unknown weight, sits judicially in one of the scales. After a 
time he will learn to allow for the conditions of his instruments, and will not expect 
in the operations of an obscure vital influence the rigorous certainty of a chemical 
reaction (Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886, vol. 1, p. 51).  
Whereas there has never been a shortage of dubious psychic claimants avoiding tests by 
maintaining that any degree of critical attitude had detrimental effects on their performances, the 
standard sceptical literature shows a remarkable lack of interest to distinguish between obvious self-
immunization strategies and observations by critical and experienced investigators with flawless 
scientific and clinical reputations and credentials.
15
 Instead, often on the backdrop of simplistic 
notions of replicability, critics have interpreted statements such as Gurney’s as clear-cut evidence 
for cover-ups of fraud the investigated subjects must have committed.
16
 Moreover, some of the 
hard-liners whose writings have informed the modern ‘enlightened’ standard discourse on psychic 
phenomena such as Joseph Jastrow, G. Stanley Hall, Hugo Münsterberg, Albert Moll, and today the 
secular messiah of the Skeptics movement, magician and professional debunker James Randi, have 
displayed attitudes and behaviours in their widely publicised ‘investigations’ of psychic claimants 
strongly reminiscent of the proverbial Great Inquisitor. One does not have to be a psychologist let 
alone an advocate of psychical research to acknowledge that the performance of subjects even in 
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 humdrum psychology experiments will usually be affected if investigators don’t even try to conceal 
their hostility towards them.
17
 
Another historical consideration complicates sweeping assurances that ‘science’ has been 
unable to confirm alleged parapsychological effects. In order for an effect claimed by one 
investigator to be confirmed by another, naturally the other must be willing to test in the first place. 
But it’s not only since Thomas Kuhn’s observations that historians, philosophers and not least men 
and women of science themselves began to acknowledge that scientists have been notoriously bad 
at keeping an open mind regarding new ideas. Add to this general observation specific and local 
instances where external conditions were hardly conducive to an unrestricted empiricism regarding 
the ‘occult’ – Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, for example, when ‘superstition’ and ‘irrationality’ were 
used as powerful rhetorical devices in the war against Catholic politics during the 
professionalization of psychology and other scientific disciplines in Germany –,  and it is hardly 
surprising that professional scientists have tended to flatly refuse opportunities of testing the 
occurrence of ‘marvellous’ phenomena.18 Chantal Marazzia and Fabio de Sio’s article in this special 
issue on parapsychological research involving animals in early twentieth-century Germany, for 
example, shows that the Kulturkampf continued to reverberate in German academic culture long 
after Bismarck, and there are many other cases in other countries where the question of the ‘occult’ 
had a broadly political impact on the formation of psychology and other modern scientific 
professions. The ‘enlightened imperative’ to do away with any supposedly irrational elements also 
guided the medical normalization of animal magnetism into modern hypnotism (cf. Gauld, 1992; 
Winter, 1998), and as Andrea Graus’s essay in this volume implies, the Spanish case formed no 
exception. 
 Regarding concrete instances of refusals to investigate, Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park 
observed that William James as the ‘father’ of American psychology “thought science would be 
renewed by more attention to the ‘dust-cloud of exceptional observations,’ but his colleagues 
regarded his own investigations of spiritualism with skepticism and mockery” (Daston & Park, 
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 On Jastrow, Hall and Münsterberg, see Blum (2007), Taylor (1996) and Sommer (2012b, 2013a, chapter 4). For 
Albert Moll’s combat against ‘superstition’ see Sommer (2012a) and Wolffram (2006). Unsavoury encounters with the 
‘Amazing Randi’,  whose lucrative bullying of deviant scientists and their subjects has earned him awards by the 
American Physical Society and the MacArthur Foundation, have been documented not only by his targets but also by 
sociologists like Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch (cf. Collins, 1983; Collins & Pinch, 1982). Regarding the support of 
Randi by prominent scientists, Harry Collins and Robert Evans protested that “it is hard to remain neutral in the face of 
the process; we find ourselves wanting to be prescriptive and say that this is ‘wrong’ – it is a dereliction of scientific 
duty. After all, among other things, scientists are there to help us know whether there are paranormal effects or 
homeopathic effects, but their input should be based on their best scientific efforts; ex-cathedra statements, or dirty 
tricks, are of no special value, nor should scientists pass their responsibility to outside groups” (Collins & Evans, 2002, 
p. 265). 
18
 On the Kulturkampf (‘Struggle for culture’) and its political and historiographical implications, see, e.g. Blackbourn 
(1993) and Sommer (2013a, chapters 1 & 4). 
 1998, p. 367). But upon closer inspection this ‘scepticism’ was programmatic rather than informed. 
James’s writings and letters are replete with complaints about ex cathedra dismissals of his 
investigations by scientific and philosophical colleagues who had refused to see for themselves if 
James was a dupe or not. When trying to recruit colleagues to privately join him test the reported 
psychic capacities of the Boston medium Leonora Piper, for example, most simply declined, and at 
least two of them – Hugo Münsterberg and Josiah Royce – nevertheless continued to publicly attack 
and misrepresent the published work by elite psychical researchers such as James and his friends 
Gurney, Richard Hodgson and F.W.H. Myers (cf. James, 1901, p. 15; Sommer, 2012b, pp. 29-31, 
38n15). In a letter to James McKeen Cattell, James therefore confessed “I used to think the story of 
the peripatetic astronomers who wouldn’t look through Galileo’s telescope at Jupiter’s moons 
(preferring aloofness coupled with authoritativeness) was a fable, but the complexion of the time 
gives it proof”.19  
Modern philosophers adopting either of the popular standard claims regarding psychical 
research and other stereotypical ‘pseudo-sciences’ – metaphysical bias, gullibility, fraud, 
methodological incompetence, lack of replicability, and theoretical poverty – such as Rogosin 
(1938), Robinson (1950), Kneale (1950), Mundle (1950), Bunge (e.g. 1967, 1984, 1991), Flew 
(1978, 1987), Toulmin (1986), Lugg (1987), Bogen & Woodward (1988), Hacking (1988, 1993), 
Churchland (1998), Mahner (2007), and Pigliucci & Boudry (2013) have shown very little regard 
for historical detail and context. Essentially relying on highly problematic secondary sources and 
counting unsuccessful replications published in mainstream science journals only, philosophers 
dismissing psychical research as pseudo- or non-science as a rule promulgate the kind of misleading 
images of scientific practice typically found in productions of the popular science industry.
20
 
Professional discussions of the demarcation problem by philosophers are strongly dominated by 
what self-appointed popular guardians of ‘Science’ and ‘Reason’ claim ‘the parapsychologists’ do, 
rather than by what these and other heterodox scientists actually have been doing as far as this is 
possible to reconstruct through original publications, archival material and other standard primary 
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 W. James to J. McKeen Cattell, 10 January 1899, in Skrupskelis & Berkeley (1992-2004, vol. 8, p. 483). Further 
historical instances of ‘aloofness coupled with authoritativeness’ in the response to psychical research by professional 
scientists were documented by Prince (1930). 
20
 The scholarly primary literature of parapsychology and psychical research mentioned above is usually ignored and 
substituted by references to popular magazines like the Skeptical Inquirer (the ‘Magazine for Science and Reason’), 
published by the international flagship of the ‘Skeptics’ movement, the ‘Committee of Skeptical Investigation’ (CSI, 
previously the ‘Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal’), monographs typically 
produced by Prometheus Press (a publishing house owned by a founder of the modern Skeptics movement, the recently 
deceased militant secular humanist philosopher Paul Kurtz (Berkley, 1987), and, not least, writings by problematic 
historical debunkers like Jastrow, Hall and Münsterberg. The usually deeply biased entries on parapsychological topics 
on Wikipedia are also dominated by the literature produced by modern Enlightenment crusaders organised in Skeptics 
clubs and associations. 
 sources of historical research.  
 
Conclusion: What does it mean to be rational? 
From about the late 1970s, discussions of demarcation have started shifting from philosophy 
to sociology and history of science, and sociological studies of public and political responses to 
parapsychological research suggest that very little has changed in its popular and academic 
reception.
21
 Whilst critics continue to launch uninformed but widely publicised attacks, editors of 
mainstream journals have admitted to stick to the rule of rejecting papers reporting positive psi 
effects irrespective of the quality of submitted manuscripts. And whereas it is still almost 
impossible for scientists to get negative replication studies in comparatively uncontroversial areas 
published, reports of unsuccessful psi experiments have become convenient ways of promoting 
one’s career particularly in psychology, where manuscripts confirming the parapsychological null 
hypothesis continue to help bolster psychology’s ‘scientific’ image. All the while, a flood of studies 
in the psychology of paranormal belief and ‘anomalistic psychology’ disregard relevant empirical 
data from psychical research, feature Joseph Jastrow, James Randi and other hard-liners as patron 
saints, and subtly perpetuate the enlightened pathologization of deviant epistemologies by 




As voices from the precognition survey by the writer Joseph Priestley in 1960s Britain 
(studied in Katy Price’s contribution to this special issue) appear to confirm, the normalization of 
the exceptional has come at the heavy prize of social stigmatisation. Regardless of social and 
intellectual status, most of us simply do not want to be associated with fields of research whose 
subject matter public opinion has equated with quackery, folly, theological corruption, intellectual 
vulgarity and mental illness. Having grown up learning that the belief in the very possibility of the 
occurrence of certain hypothetical phenomena anachronistically labelled as ‘supernatural’23 
constitutes the absolute opposite of a ‘scientific’ and ‘rational’ attitude, we are hardly ever 
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 For sociological and historical studies of demarcation, see, for example, Mauskopf (1979), Wallis (1979), Gieryn 
(1983), Rupnow, Lipphardt, Thiel, & Wesseley (2008). Sociological investigations of parapsychology are, e.g., Collins 
& Pinch (1979, 1982), Hess (1992, 1993), McClenon (1984). 
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 See the standard textbook of ‘anomalistic psychology’ (Zusne & Jones, 1989) and activities by members of the 
Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit at Goldsmiths University, London, who also publish a popular ‘Skeptic’ 
magazine. More differentiating and scrupulously informed works on clinical and empirical aspects of exceptional 
human experiences like Cardeña, Lynn, & Krippner (2000) still form the exception in discussions of the psychology of 
‘paranormal belief’. 
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 While Richard Noakes has shown that elite Victorian physical scientists investigating spiritualism and related 
problems fundamentally challenged traditional naturalism-supernaturalism dichotomies (e.g. Noakes, 2004a, 2004b, 
2008), I made a similar case in my reconstruction of debates around psychical research in the human sciences, notably 
during the formation of modern professionalized psychology (Sommer, 2013a). 
 encouraged to investigate the historicity of modern standard attitudes dismissive of the subject 
matter of psychical research. It can therefore be safely assumed that these cultural and social 
constraints have coerced many to keep their unorthodox convictions to themselves. A possible case 
in question might be Karl Popper, who wrote to Ivor Grattan-Guinness in 1984 regarding 
parapsychological phenomena: “I feel confident that such things exist, but the attempt to make them 
‘scientific’ seems to me not only unsuccessful so far, but to lead to a travesty” (Grattan-Guinness, 
1998, p. 470). Many readers might be surprised to hear that Popper was convinced that psychic 
phenomena occur, and Popper’s request to the recipient of his letter of treating this admission 
confidentially (Grattan-Guinness thought it justified to disregard the request after Popper’s death) 
might be interpreted in the above sense.
24
 
 The stigma of deviant beliefs has also created severe methodological problems for 
historians.
25
 Though triumphalist and great scientist histories are no longer in vogue for good 
reasons, a downside of postmodern historians’ anxious avoidance of producing hagiographies is an 
almost complete neglect to identify and integrate into analysis certain casualties of crude 
historiographical conventions and generalizations. I assume, for example, that most readers will 
never have heard of the main protagonist of Marazzia and de Sio’s essay in this volume, Karl Krall. 
Critical but sympathetic and thoroughly contextualized reconstructions of works and concerns of 
other historical figures whose dedication to unorthodox scientific questions have resulted in their 
practical invisibility in official histories regardless of their high intellectual calibre and integrity – 
possible candidates might include Alice Johnson and Whately Carington in Britain, Gerda Walther 
and Fritz Grunewald in Germany, and Walter Franklin Prince and Rhea White in the US – may 
enrich historical and philosophical scholarship by providing a fine-grained picture of sensibilities 
and epistemological positions that appear to have become scarce today. Not least, like Ian Kidd’s 
article in this volume, such studies might remind us that a cultivation of basic intellectual virtues 
(such as humility in the face of evidence contradicting prior beliefs, and courage in defending new 
discoveries even at personal risk) is necessary for the scientific enterprise to maintain its popular 
appeal as an intrinsically progressive endeavour. 
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 As a note to the history of falsificationism, it is curious that both William James and Popper used anomalous 
colouration in birds to illustrate refuting instances. James announced that for him a decade of first-hand tests of the 
trance phenomena of Leonora Piper had falsified the great induction of psychology, nihil est in intellectu quod non prius 
fuerit in sensu: “If you will let me use the language of the professional logic shop, a universal proposition can be made 
untrue by a particular instance. If you wish to upset the law that all crows are black, you mustn’t seek to show that no 
crows are; it is enough if you prove one single crow to be white. My own white crow is Mrs. Piper” (James, 1896, p. 
884). Popper’s subsequent choice of a black swan as a falsifying instance is peculiar enough, though it is probably idle 
to speculate whether he was familiar with James’s statement. 
25
 I reserve a comprehensive discussion of fundamental methodological difficulties raised by historians’ safe but 
stagnant reliance on problematic secondary sources on the ‘occult’ for a separate occasion. 
  Lastly, it might be evident that historians addressing certain asymmetries firmly ingrained in 
western academic culture and thinking styles face the risk of becoming intellectual outlaws 
themselves. To attempt facilitating balanced and informed discussion of forever disputed areas of 
human experience like those that have formed the subject matter of psychical research requires 
cutting through a rather thorny thicket of unhelpful myths of scientific epistemologies and practice, 
whose deep roots have vanished from public awareness. Hence, even though it should be clear that 
as historians it can hardly be our job to resolve age-old scientific controversies let alone make 
claims regarding the existence or non-existence of psychic phenomena, just by pointing out glaring 
asymmetries in the standard discourse about psychical research there is a genuine danger of 
attracting the ire of certain influential groups and figures who have been quick to level charges of 
‘relativism’ and even ‘anti-science’. Aware that the topics treated in this special issue thoroughly go 
against the grain of many ideologies and epistemological standard positions, its contributors strove 
to employ those core principles that most will agree make good science as well as good history: 
contextualised evidence and differentiated analysis. 
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